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~ v • 
.ft.- 141~-
t' S~~ CITY OF JACKSONVILLE 
Ap~ from Fla. Dist Ct of Appeal 
-~/civil Timely 
Appellant, the manager of a Jacksonville drive-in, commenced ~fc., __ .... 1. 
4U'~a,wu 
~~~ an action in Fla. state court seeking to have a city ordinance 
~~~ prohibiting nudity in drive-in motion pictures declared violative 
~ t... of the First Amendment. The trial ct denied relief and the Dist 
of Appeal affirmed citing a CA 5 case reaching the same result. 
~~ ' Ty::la Sup Ct denied cert by a vote of 4-3. 
~ 2. acts: A Jacksonville ordinance makes it unlawful for a drive-in 
~· ~
~~t: 
"any motion picture ... in which the human male or female bare 
~ h~ buttocks, human bare breasts, or human male or female bare pubic 
~ ~~ ' areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit 
., 
-2-
is visible from any __ public street or public lace. Violation 
oft is sect1on snail e punis a e as a Class C offense ••• " 
In March, 1972, appellant was served with a summons charging him 
with violating this ordinance by showing a film~- "Class of '74." 
[The nature or contents of the film are not discussed in the 
papers] Pursuant to stipulation between appellant and the City, 
the prosecution was continued indefin.i tely in order to allow 
appellant to bring an action in state court testing the ordinance's 
constitutionality. 
In affirming the trial court's holding that the ordinance was 
constitutional, the Dist Ct of Appeal cited only Chemline, Inc. 
v. City of Grand Prarie, 364 Fo2d 721 (CA 5, 1966)(Rives, Brown, 
1 ~ Moore, CA 2 by desig). In Chemline, CA 5 upheld a similar 
ordinance stating that it was 
"almost self-evident that a city is well within its legitimate 
police powers in enacting reasonable ordinances to protect children 
in its public streets and highways from viewing 'bare buttocks or 
bare female breasts, or striptease, burlesque or nudist-type scenes 
which constitute the main or primary material." 364 F .2d at 724. 
3. Contentions: Appellant argues that the ordinance is violative 
of the First Amendment in that it proscribes protected, non-obscend 
speech. He relies heavily on a recent CA 7 decision, Cinecom 
Theatres Midwest States, Inc., v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 
(1973)(Duffy, Kiley, Campbell) where an identical city ordinance 
was declared violative of treFirst Amendment. CA 7 reasoned that 
protection of children might permit a variable standard of obscenit~ 
but did not permit a blanket declaration that all exhibitions of 
~----~ 
public nudity, regardless of context, were prescribable under the 
guise of protecting minors. 
" 
-.J-
CA 7 concluded: 
"Although a city possess the authority to regulate this industry 
for the protection of its children from exposure to material obscene 
as. to them, the ordinance here is much broader than that permissible 
objective and therefore runs afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 473 F.2d 1302 
Although it recognized minor factual distinctions with Chemline, CA 7 
expressly declined to follow the reasoning of Chemline. Appellant 
also relies on Cohen v. California and several state court decisions 
invalidating similar ordinances. 
In a rather cryptic response, appellee dismisses the asserted 
conflict between Chemline and Cinecom by stating "neither of these 
cases are under review here." It defends the statute as a proper 
exercise of the city's police power to abate public nuisance~. --
4o Discussion: If the Court is interested in resolving the question 
of whether non-obscene nudity shown in a drive-in can be proscribed 
this is probably a good case. The conflict seems clear and fairly 
widespread. The Court heard argument in a case two years ago, 
Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972), where the owner of a drive-in 
was convicted for showing non-obscene movies containing nudity unqek 
' 
the Wash. state obscenity statute. The Court unanimously reversed 
the conviction on the ground tht the state statute did not give 
notice that a lesser standard of "obscenity" would be employed ,. 
for drive-in type movies. - The Court explicitly preterrnitrLed 
the question of whether a lower standard could be proper. In 
a concurring opinion, the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 
stated that he had "no doubt" that a properly drafted state statute 
directed at nudity in drive-ins would be constitutional. 
-4-
Aside from the narrow issue of how far a sta te can regulate 
a drive-in under .a nuisance theory, the case presents the broader 
question of what limits, if any, can be placed on the state's 
regulation of obscenity for the protection of children. The basic 
questions would seem to be left unresolved by Miller-Hamling. 
There is a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: December 26, 1974 
FROM: Joel Klein 
No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 
This is a rather trivial case regarding a municipal 
ordinance barring all nudity at drive-in movie theatres 
that are visible from public streets or places. I have 
checked the record and the theatre in question is plainly 
visible from several adjacent streets and homes. The appellee 
city admits that the material is not obscene under Miller 
but argues that it may be proscribed as a ~uisance because 
the theatre is visible to the unwilling passerby and because 
it attracts children. 
I do not have much trouble with the case. All that 
is required of theatre owners is to insure that their screens 
-----"'-- -........._ ..___ - --------
are not visible outside of the theatre. Subject to this - ~---....._ ----.._ 
condition the state is perfectly willing to allow these m9vies 
/UG~c~ 
to be shown. Thus, there is no effort at content c~o1 
and no real First Amendment issue at stake. In short, the 
statute is akin to a time, place and manner regulation that, 
in my view, is eminently reasonable. To the extent that 
the city seeks to "censor" material, it does s~th respect 
to minors, and under the Court's opinion in Ginsberg v. 
2. 
New York, authored by Justice Brennan, this sort of regula-
tion of minors is allowed.* 
J.K. 
ss 
*Appellant relies principally on California v. Cohen, the 
vulgar language case. He claims that the drive-in does not 
present a "captive audience" problem and notes that in 
Cohen children were able to witness the vulgar words. What-
ever you may think of Cohen, it is so readily distin uishable 
that it will present no problem in this case. 
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No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
Dear Chief: 
Sally Smith and Joel Klein have persuaded me that 
it's OK for kids to look at bare breasts and bare buttocks 
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.:§nvrtttU <!f®rt of flrt ~th .:§t!rl.tg 
'J.ta$:frht:gtc:n. ~. <!f. 211,?'!~ 
CHAMBE RS OF 
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR. March 1, 197 5 
No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
Dear Chief: 
As indicated at the Conference on yesterday, I was 
prepared to vote - and did vote tentatively - to sustain 
the Jacksonville ordinance. The discussion at Conference 
prompted me to reexamine my position. I will now vote to 
reverse. 
· This is not an obscenity case. I had viewed it as a 
"time- and-place" type of regulation of drive-in theaters, 
a type ordinance which would be entirely valid if properly 
drawn. The difficulty with the Jacksonville ordinance, as 
I now view it, is that its purpose is ambiguous. 
If designed to prevent the "nuisance" of traffic delay 
and accidents, the prohibition would not have been limited 
to exposures of the human body. Persons (and especially 
teenagers) using public streets and sidewalks would be 
equally diverted by some of the horror and crime scenes 
r egularly portrayed on the movie screens. Similarly, if 
the purpose of the ordinance was to protect privacy, it 
would not have been limited to visibility from public stree~s 
or public places. The evidence includes a complaint by a 
private family because the screen was visible from their 
residence. Cinecom Theatres v. Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 
1307 (CA7 1973) is directly in point on the privacy issue. 
As the ordinance is neither protective of privacy nor 
rationally tailored to promote traffic safety, its real 
purpose seems to be directed only at the exhibition - in 
public view - of all scenes in which the described areas of 
the human body may be visible. This, I am now persuaded, 
- 2 -
is an impermissible form of censorship, going beyond the 
obscenity standards applicable to minors as articulated 
in our cases. 
Also, the ordinance has elements of vagueness. The 
operator of a drive-in theater would have a difficult time 
deciding how much of a "human female bare breast" could 
be exposed in a film without subjecting himself to criminal 
penalty. Conversely, a wide range of discretion would be 
vested in the prosecutorial authorities. 
As I reread the miserable briefs filed by appellant 
and appellee in this case, and recalled the low quality 
of the oral argument, I was reminded of the appropriate-
ness of your comments in Chicago last week as to the 





f 0--'-' ·-t--:--_..1 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBE RS OF 
~ltJtUlttt ~curl of flrt ~th ~fllftg 
~a$lfhtgfon.18. ~· 211~'-1~ 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. March 1, 197 5 
No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
Dear Chief: 
As indicated at the Conference on yesterday, I was 
prepared to vote - and did vote tentatively - to sustain 
the Jacksonville ordinance. The discussion at Conference 
prompted me to reexamine my position. I will now vote to 
reverse. 
This is not an obscenity case. I had viewed it as a 
"time-and-place" type of regulation of drive-in theaters, 
a type ordinance which would be entirely valid if properly 
drawn. The difficulty with the Jacksonville ordinance, as 
I now view it, is that its purpose is ambiguous. 
If designed to prevent the "nuisance" of traffic delay 
and accidents, the prohibition would not have been limited 
to exposures of the human body. Persons (and especially 
teenagers) using public streets and sidewalks would be 
equally diverted by. some of the horror and crime scenes 
r egularly portrayed on the movie screens. Similarly, if 
the purpose of the ordinance was to protect privacy, it 
would not have been limited to visibility from public streets 
or public places. The evidence includes a complaint by a 
private family because the screen was visible from their 
residence. Cinecom Theatres v. Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 
1307 (CA7 1973) is directly in point on the privacy issue. 
As the ordinance is neither protective of privacy nor 
rationally tailored to promote traffic safety, its real 
purpose seems to be directed only at the exhibition - in 
public view - of all scenes in which the described areas of 
the human body may be visible. This, I am now persuaded, 
- 2 -
is an impermissible form of censorship, going beyond the 
obscenity standards applicable to minors as articulated 
in our cases. 
Also, the ordinance has elements of vagueness. The 
operator of a drive-in theater would have a difficult time 
deciding how much of a "human female bare breast" could 
be exposed in a film without subjecting himself to criminal 
penalty. Conversely, a wide range of discretion would be 
vested in the prosecutorial authorities. 
As I reread the miserable briefs filed by appellant 
and appellee in this case, and recalled the low quality 
of the oral argument, I was reminded of the appropriate-
ness of your comments in Chicago last week as to the 
shockingly low level of advocacy to which we are frequently 
subjected. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
March 3, 1975 
No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
Dear Bill: 
I will be happy to write for the Court in this case, 
and thank you for the opportunity - now that I've seen the 
light and changed my initial tentative vote. 
Sih.cerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
"-·-···''"'"'"' "'-''--· J.'1,.,.,.._,..' .. ,,_, 
March 3, 1975 
No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
I will be happy to write for the Court in this case, 
and thank you for the opportunity - now that I've seen the 
light and changed my tnitial tentative vote • 
.. Sincerely, 












.*u:prrnu cqllurl of tire 'Jfutittb .:§tlilig 
~CU'f'frbtgi:on. tiJ. <!f. 20.?>!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
March 3, 1975 
RE: No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 
Dear Chief: 
This is to confirm that I have assigned the 




The Chief Justice 




TO: Mr. Joel Klein DATE: March 24, 1975 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
Having spent most of the day reviewing your draft of 
3/21, including reading of a number of the cases cited, I 
am reinforced in the wisdom of reconsidering my tentative 
review that the ordinance could be sustained. Your draft, 
which is well organized and analyzed, seems unanswerable -
although able lawyers always find some answer. 
I have performed my usual personal editing. Some of 
this is pure form and trivial, although I have made some 
changes in emphasis and nuances. 
As you put this through another draft, consider the 
following points: 
1. Although I have never written about the "right of 
privacy", I place a rather high premium on personal privacy 
and want to be careful what we say. In this connection, does 
Justice White have anything in his recent £2! opinion that 
may be quotable in a note? I have added in note 4 a quote 





rights of privacy must be balanced against rights of expression. ., .. 
I believe this is correct. If you find a better reference or 
quote, you might add it in note 4 or even in the text. 
·' 
,-





2. I also want to be especially careful not to go 
overboard in proclaiming First Amendment rights for children 
of all ages. You will recall whet we said in Goss, in which 
we quoted Potter Stewart's concurrence in Tinker. I would 
rather like to quote Stewart again in a note which makes the 
point that the age of minors is a relevant factor. I feel 
quite differently, as you know, about a freshman in college 
·than I do a fifth grader. 
3. A still further sensitive area with me is the 
doctrine of overbreadth. The draft discusses this in Part III, 
and generally is in line with my thoughts. I would appreciate 
it, nevertheless, if you took a further careful look at Part III 
Bear in mind that Justice White, writing in Broadrick, intended 
and he felt strongly about this - to rechannel the overbrdadth 
doctrine into narrower limits. Justice White may well be 
writing a dissent in this case. I would like to give him 
as small a target as possible. 
4. All of us have agreed that a municipal ordinance 
directed at traffic safety validly could proscribe all moving 
picture screens visible from public streets. I would like to 
say this, in substance in an appropriately located footnote. 
On page 12 you cite some old friends which have given 
me a certain amount of trouble: Coates, Gooding and Lewis. 
Although these are now established precedents, which I will 
follow when I have no other choice, I do not wish unnecessarily 






could find other cases to compare with ~ and Chaplinsky 
and omit Gooding altogether. If this is not feasible, I 
could be persuaded to leave these cases in the opinion -
although I know that they will be especially difficult for 
Justice Blackmun to "take'' as I think he dissented in all of 
them. 
* * * * * 
I will not be able to get back to this case before 
Thursday. I suggest that you continue the editing process, 
working with Penny, with the view to giving me another 
draft on Thursday. I would like to clear it then for the 
printer. As you may recall, I have a speaking commitment 
at Northwestern Law School in Portland, Oregon, and will 
leave the Court on April 3, returning April 7. I would 
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( 
' ' ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR . 
$5uprtntt Of!tttrlltf t£rt ~b $5tatt.s 
Jfufrhtgttm.lO. <!f. 2ngr~~ 
April 2, 1975 
RE : No . 73-1942 Erznoznik, etc . v. City of Jacksonville 
Dear Lewis: 
I am happy to join your very fine opinion in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 






JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
,ju.vrttttt Qfltnd ltf tqt ~b ,jhttts 
1llaslfiughtn. ~. C!f. 2ll~'l-~ 
April 2, 1975 
) 
Re: No. 73-1942 --Richard Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 




,jup:rtmt Q}ourlcf tlrt ~th jfattg 
'Jila,g frhtghm. ~. (!}. 21lp'f. ;l 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
April 2, 1975 
No. 73-1942 - Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.hprmu <!Jottrl.rf tJ.r.t ~ttittb' _.fat.tg 
._zwftittgtou:. J. <!J. 2llp_,.$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
April 11, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1942 - Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
.• 
.§u:punu tq' o url of Urt 'Jjt.nift b .§hili .1l' 
'Jllcurlyin¢lllt.lfl. <q. 2D~,t~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS May 22, 1975 
Dear Lewis: 
Please jo~n me in 73-1942, 
ERZNOZNIK v. JACKSONVILLE. 
LJOi) Iff 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
., 
... 
~ •• I 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§u:putttt Qfltltrlllf tqt ~tti:ttb .:§t g 
'Jltufrittghm. ~· ar. 2llp~~ 
June 16, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1942 - Erzonznik v. City of Jacksonville 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
June 18, 1975 
case Held for No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 73-1176 106 1 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop 
This petition was held for Erznoznik because petitioner 
had challenged, inter alia, a city ordinance prohibiting an 
adult movie theatre from locating within 200 yards of a 
church. Although petitioner pressed this point in district 
court, it apparently did not raise it on appeal and does not 
present it in the petition. Accordingly Erznoznik has no 
bearing on the petition. 
The two~.!ssues that petitioner does raise pertain to 
an ordinance vaguely similar to the licensing revocation 
statute challenged in No. 73-296 Huffman v. Pursue. 
,. 
... 
,: Petitioner claims that the ordinance effects an unconstitutional 
prior restraint, and that its procedures are constitutionally 
inadequate. In view of the fact that petitioner filed the 
instant complaint in federal court, his state licensing 
revocation hearing has been sit;q,yml. As a result it is not 
,· ... 
clear whether, if indeed the license is eventually revoked, 
it will be on the basis of the zoning provision concerning 
adult theatres or on the basis of the previous showing of 
obscene movies. Nor is it clear from the petition what 
procedures will be used to process the case at the 
administrative hearing and on judicial review. 
With the case in this tentative and very confused posture, l' 
I will vote to deny. ; 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss '· ' 
.· 
-
June 19, 1975 
No. 73·1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 
Dear Mr. Putzel: 
The line-up in the above case is as follows: 
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., 
joined. Douglas, J., ,filed a concurring opinion. Burger, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Which lehnquist, J., 
joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Henry Putzel, jr. 
lfp/ss 






v ._v ,_, .u .... ,bb .I....ILU-.IL1\J~L1..LL'- V • V ..L.L .L V,L; V~VL'\..WV.L' V ..LL.J.LJ.LI 
A Jacksonville, Florida ordinance, directed at 
drive-in movie theaters, prohibits the exhibition of 
films which contain nudity. The ordinance was sustained 
by the Florida courts, and came to us on appeal. 
As we conclude that the ordinance infringes First 
Amendment rights, we reverse the decision of the State 
Court. 
This is not an obscenity ordinance, as it proscribes 
the showing of any nudity, however innocent or educational. 
It nevertheless was defended on three grounds: (i) as 
preventing offense to persons on public streets, (ii) pro-
tecting children from scenes of nudity, and (iii), as 
a traffic measure. 
In our view, the ordinance is both overbroad and 
underinclusive when tested against its specified purposes. 
The intrusion on privacy of passersby is limited; and 
the legitimate State interest in protecting children from 
obscenity is not furthered; and, if designed as a traffic 
. . 
2. 
measure, many things - such as scenes of horror and 
violence - are more likely to distract than many of the 
innocent and fleeting shots of nudity that are barred 
by this ordinance. 
In sum, although a city or state has legitimate 
interests that would support a nondiscriminatory ordinance 
regulating drive-in theaters, this ordinance unduly 
infringes upon First Amendment rights with little prospect 
of furthering any legitimate state interest. 
Mr. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion. 
The Chief Justice filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice White 
also filed a dissenting opinion. 
~ d 't! 
~ 
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6-20-75 LFP/gg ERZNOZNIK v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE 
A Jacksonville, Florida ordinance, directed at 
drive-in movie theaters, prohibits the exhibition of 
fi~s which contain nudity. The ordinance was sustained 
by the Florida courts, and came to us on appeal. 
As we conclude that the ordinance infringes First 
Amendment rights, we reverse the decision of the State 
Court. 
This is not an obscenity ordinance, as it proscribes 
the showing of any nudity, however innocent or educational. 
It nevertheless was defended on three grounds: (i) as 
preventing offense to persons on public streets, (ii) pro-
tecting children from seenes of nudity, and (iii), as 
a traffic measure. 
In our view, the ordir~nce is both overbroad and 
underinclusive when tested against its specified purposes. 
The intrusion on privacy of passersby is limited; and 
the legitimate State interest in protecting children from 
obscenity is not furthered; and, if designed as a traffic 
- " . 
' 





measure, many things 




such as scenes of horror and 
2. . ' 
,•· 
t·t.it· 
I' '>'i; v·, 
i.f·,, ]{ "''-~\. 
violence - are more likely to distract than many of the .. ·~ 
innocent and fleeting shots of nudity that are barred 
by this ordinance. 
In sum, although a city or state has legitimate 
interests that would support a nondiscriminatory ordinance 
regulating drive-in theaters, this ordinance unduly 
infringes upon First Amendment rights with little prospect 
of furthering any legitimate state interest • .. ··' , 
Mr. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion. 
The Chie£ Justice filad a dissenting opinf.on, in 
which Mr .• ' Justice Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice White 
also filed a dissenting opinion. 
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SUPREME COURT F HE UNITED STATES 
No. 73-1942 
Richard Erznoznik, etc.,) . . 
Appellant, On Appeal from the D1stnct 
Court of Appeal of Florida 
v. for the First District. 
City of Jacksonville. 
[April -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a 
Jackson ville, Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing 
films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when 
its screen is visible from a public street or place. 
I 
Appellant, Richard ErzPoznik, is the manager of the 
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March 
13, 1972, he was charged with violating § 330.313 of the 
municipsJ code for exhibiting a motion picture, visible 
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare 
breasts were shown." 1 The ordi!lance, adopted January 
14, H)72, provides: 
"3:30.313 Dnve-In Theaters, Films Visible From 
Public Sfreets or Public Places. It shall be unlawful 
• The movt-•, "CI•1,; of 'i.t,'' had bc·en rated "R" by the l'viotion 
l'iclnn A~l:<oewtion ot Am< nra. \n "R" rating indieates that yuuths 
may lw ndnuttPd only wh"n acromp1111it>d by a parent or ~uardian. Rce 
gpm·rall~ Fnnlman. 'liw :\Totion f'icturf Hatmg System of 1968. A 
Con:-;tJtntJOnal Anal~·s1~ of Rr>lf-H<•gnlatJOn by thr Film Indu~try, 73 
Col L. Hrv 18,'\ (197.3) Although there i8 nothing in the record 
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and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any 
ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture pro-
jection machine operator, manager, owner, or any 
other person connected with or employed by any 
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist 
in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other ex-
hibit in which the human male or female bare but-
tocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare 
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, 
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or 
public place. Violation of this section shall be pun-
ishable as a Class C offense." 
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor, 
successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the 
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate 
declaratory a.ction. In that action appellee, the city of 
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen 
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public 
streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was 
also testimony indicating that people had been observed 
watching films while sitting outs~de the theater in parked 
cars and in the grass. 
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate 
exercise of the municipality's police power, and ruled that 
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights. 
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida, 
I 
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 ( 1974), relying exclusively on 
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721 
( CA5 1966), which had sustained a similar ordirtance. z 
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges 
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes 
pictures of uncovered female breasts and buttocks. 
2 The only other Circuit. Court of Appeals to consider this ques-
tion reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theatres Midwest 
Stateli, Inc . v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973). 
~· 
~·. ~ ,. ... 
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dissenting. 294 So. 2d 93 (1974). We noted probable 
jurisdiction/ 419 U. S. 822 (1974), and now reverse. 
II 
Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond 
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U. S. 15 ( 1973), and thus applies to films that 
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). Nevertheless, it maintains 
that any movie containing nudity which is visible from a 
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several 
theories are advanced to justify this contention. 
A 
Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect 
its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that 
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinance, however, 
does not protect citizens from all movies that might 
offend; rather it singles out films containing nudity, pre-
sumably because the lawmakers considered them espe-
cially offensive to passersby. 
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the 
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy 
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or audi-
tors-in a variety of co11texts. See, e. g., Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949'); Breard v. Alexander, 341 
U.S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15 (1971); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298 (1974). See generally Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: 
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 N. W. U. L. 
3 A local ordinance is deemed a state statute for purposes of invok-
ing this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C § 1257 (2). See King 
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Rev. 153 ( 1972). Such cases demand delicate balancing 
because 
"[i]n th[e] sphere of collision between claims of 
privacy and those of [free speech or] free press, the 
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of our society." 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,- U.S.-,-
(1975), 
Although each case ultimately must depend on its own 
specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A 
State or municipality may protect individual privacy 
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regu-
lations applicable to all speech irrespective of content. 
See Kovacs v. Cooper, supra; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
536, 554 (1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes 
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech 
on the ground that they are more offensive than others, 
the First Amendment strictly limits its power. See, 
e. g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 
92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S., at 97 (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Such selective restrictions have been upheld 
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the 
home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 
(1970), 4 or the degree of captivity makes it impractical 
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. See 
• Rowan involved a congressional statute that permits a person 
receiving "a pandering advertisement" which he believes to be 
"erotically arousing or sexually provocative" to instruct the Post-
master General to inform the sender that such mail is not to be 
sent in the future. The Court upheld the statute, emphasizing that 
individual privacy is entitled to greater protection in the home 
than on the streets and noting tha1· "the right of every person 'to 
be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others 
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Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra.4 But as Mr. 
Justice Harlan cautioned· 
"The ability of government, consonant with the 
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to pro-
tect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a 
showing that substant)al privacy interests are being 
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any 
broader view of this authority would effectively em-
ploy a majority to silence dissidents simply as a 
matter of personal predilections." Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U. S., at 21. 
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our 
pluralistic society, c0nstantly proliferating new and in-
genious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive 
audiences for many purposes." Rowan v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U. S., at 736. Much that we encounter 
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensi-
bilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit 
the government to decide which types of otherwise pro-
tected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protec-
tion for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent 
the narrow circumstances described above,6 the burden 
5 In Lehman the Court sustained a municipality's policy of barring 
political advE'rtisements while permitting nonpolitical advertisements 
on city buses. The issue was whether the city lw.d created a ''public 
forum" and thereby obligated itself to accept all advertising. While 
concluding that no pubhc forum had been establishPd, both the 
plurality and concurrmg opimons recognized that the degree of 
cap6v1t~· and thE' resultant intruswn on privacy is significantly 
greater for a passl'nger on a bus than for a per~on on the strl:'et. 
See id., at :302 -304 (ovimon of MR .• JUHTICE BLACKMUN), and at 
:306-308 (DouGLAS, L concurrmg). See also Public Utilities Cornm'n 
v. Pollak, 343 U ::3.451,467 (1952) (DouoLAs, .T., dil:lSCnting). 
6 lt ha ; also bPen suggestE'd that government may proscribe, by 
a proper!) framrd law, "the willful use of scurrilous languagE' calcu-
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normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bom· 
bardment of [hisl sensibilities simply by averting [his] 
eyes." Cohen v. Cal1:jornia, 403 U. S., at 21. See also 
Spence v. Washington,. 418 U. S. 405, 412 (1974) . 
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies 
solely on the basis of content. 7 Its effect is to deter 
drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any 
nudity, however innocent or even educational,S This 
discrimination cannot be justified as a means of prevent-
feld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901, 905 (PowELL, J., dissenting) . 
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In such cases 
the speaker may seek to "force public confrontation with the: 
potentially offensive aspects of the work." Id., at 470. It may 
not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate 
"verbal [or visual] assault," Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, that justifies 
proscription. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) .. 
In the present case, however, appellant is not trying to reach, much. 
less shock, unwilling viewers. Appellnnt manages a commercial enter-
prise which depends for its success on paying customers, not on free-
loading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, the-
screen of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not 
pay. 
1 Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a 
book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. See Miller 
v. California., 413 U. S., at. 24; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229' 
(1972). In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind 
of public nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws. 
See Rot.'L v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (DoUGJ::AS, J., 
dissenting) ("No one would suggest that. the First Amendment per-
mits nudity m p11blic places") . Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). 
8 Such a deterrent, although it might not result in total suppres-· 
sion of these movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser 
v. Randall, :357 U.S. 513, 518-·519 (1958). The record does not indi-
cate how much it would cost to block public view of appellant's 
theater. Such costs generally will vary with circumstances. In one· 
('ase the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter milliorr 
dollars. See Olympic Drive-In Theatre, inc. v. City of P(l{ledale., 
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ing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance 
seeks only to keep these films from being seen from pub-
lic streets and places where the offended viewer readily 
can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in 
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for 
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup 
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967). Thus, we con-
clude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the 
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise 
protected speech on the basis of its content. 
B 
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as 
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to pro-
tect children. Appellee maintains that even though it 
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity 
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means 
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence. 
It is well settled that a State or municipality can 
adopt more stringPnt controls on communicative mate-
rials available to youths than on those available to 
adults. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 
(1968). Nevertheless, minors are entitled to a signifi-
cant measure of First Amendment protection, see Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 
393 U. S. 503 (196~)), and only in relatively narrow and 
well-defined circumstances ma.y government bar public 
dissemination of protected materials to them. See, e. g., 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U. S. 676 
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968). 
ln this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at pro-
hibiting youths from viewing the films, the restriction is 
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed 
against sexually explicit nudity nor is it otherwise 
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containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespec-
tive of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a 
film containing a picture of ,\baby's buttOcks, the nude 
body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which 
nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might pro-
scribe newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as 
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly all nudity 
cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors. See Gins-
berg v. New York, supra.9 Nor can such a broad restric-
tion be justified by any other governmental interest 
pertaiuing to minors. Speech that is neither obscene as 
to youths nor subJect to some other legitimate proscrip-
tion cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young 
from from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks 
unsuitable for them. In most circumstances/ 0 the values 
protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable 
9 In Ginsberg the Court adopted a vanation of the adult obscenity 
standardH rn11ncmtrd in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), 
and Memoirs v Massachu.~etts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opin-
ion) In Miller v California, sup·ra, we abandoned the Roth-Memoirs 
tr::;t for judging obscenit)· with retiprct to adults. We have not had 
occa~ton to decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formu-. 
lation. It IS rlrar, howevt>r, that under any test of obscenity as to 
minors not. all nudtty would be proscribed. Rather, to be obscene 
"such expres.~1on must be, m some sigmficant way, erotic." Cohen v. 
California, 403 U. S., at 20. See Paris AduLt Theatre 1 v. Slaton, 
413 u. S. 49, 106-107 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
10 The First Amendment nghts of minors are not "co-extensive· 
With those of adults." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School DU3t., 393 U. S., at 515 (STEWART, J., concurring). 
'rAJ state rna; permis~tbly d"trrmine that at least in some precisely 
drlineated areas , a thild-like o<omeone in a captive audience-is not 
po;;sessed of 1hat full capacity for individual cho1ce which 1s the 
preHuppo~ition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S., at 64!)-650 (STEWAHT, J., concurrmg). In assessing 
whether a minor has the requisite capacity for individual chmce 
the age of the mmor 1s a ~ignificant factor. See Rowan v. Post Office; 
/Jcet ., 397 U S., at 741 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
•' 
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when government seeks to control the flow of information 
to minors. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School Dist., supra. Cf. West Virginia /3d. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jack-
sonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expression 
accessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscription.u 
c 
At oral argument appellee, for the first time, sought 
to justify its ordina.nce as a traffic regulation. It claimed 
that nudity on a drive-in movie screen distracts passing 
motorists, thus slowing the flow of traffic and increasing 
the likelihood of accidents. 
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinance 
suggests that it is aimed at traffic regulation. Indeed, 
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from pub-
lic places as well as public streets, thus indicating that 
it is not a traffic regulation. But even if this were the 
purpose of the ordinahce, it nonetheless would be invalid. 
By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting 
and innocent glimpses of nudity the legislative classifica-
tion is strikingly underinclusive. There is no reason to 
think tha.t a wide variety of other scenes in the custom-
ary screen diet, ranging from soap opera to violence, 
would be any less distraeting to the passing motorist. 
This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive clas-
sifications on the sound theory that a legislature may 
deal with one part of a problem without addressing all 
of it. See, e. g., Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U. S. 
483, 488-489 (1955) . This presumption of statutory 
validity, however, has less foree when a classification 
turns on the subject matter of expression. "[A]bove all 
else, ' the First Amendment means that government has-
no power to restrict expression because of its message, 





.. . \.•,· 
: ' 
73-1942-0PINION 
10 ERZNOZNJK v CITY OF JACKSONVILLE 
its ideas, its subject matter, ot· its content." Police 
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus, 
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the 
First Amendment itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regula-
tion cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless 
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.) . 
Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) . 
Appellee offers no justification, nor are we aware of 
any, for distinguishing movies containing nudity from 
all other movies in a regulation designed to protect 
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance can-
not be salvaged by this rationale.12 
III 
Even though none of the reasons advanced by appellee 
will sustain the Jacksonville ordinance, it remains for us 
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on 
its face. This Court has long recognized that a demon-
strably overbroad statute or ordinance may deter the 
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. None-
theless, when considering a facial challenge if is neces-
sary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalida-
tion may result in unnecessary interference with a state 
regulatory program. In accommodating these compet-
ing interests the Court has held that a state statute 
should not be deemed facially m valid unless it is not 
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state 
courts, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479. 497 
12 This is not to r:-·ay that a narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory 
trafftc regulation requiring screening of drive-in movie theaters from 
the v1ew of motorists " 'ould not be a reasonable exercise of police 
power. St>c Police Dept. of Chtcfl{Jo v. Mosley, 408 U.S., at 98, and 
.. ~S.e& cited.. 
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(1965), and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression 
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U. S. 601, 012-615 (1973). See generally 
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). 
In the present case the possibility of a limiting instruc-
tion appears remote. Appellee explicitly joined in this 
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing 
to stay appellant's prosecution.18 Moreover, thE! ordi-
nance by its plain terms is not easily susceptible to a 
narrowing construction.14 Indeed, when the state courts 
were presented with this overbreadth challenge they 
made no effort to restrict its application. Compare 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613 
(1971), and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-449 
(1969), with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-
576 (1941), and Chaplin~ky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 572-573 (1942). In these circumstances, particu-
larly where as here appellee offers several distinct justifi-
cations for the ordinance in its broadest terms, there is no 
reason to assume that th~ ordinance can or will be deci-
sively narrowed. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
F. S. 104, J 11-112 ( 1972); 7'ime, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 
374, 397 (1967). 
n In this respect the presrnt case arises in a posture that differs 
from most challenges to a statute or ordinance considered by this 
Court Tvpically m ~nch ('ases the issue arises in a context where 
the statute or ordinance has been applied to allegedly unprotected 
actlVlty. Thus, we are able to consider the constitutionality of the 
statute "as applied" as well as "on its faca." 
14 The only narrowing construction which occurs to us would be 
to hmit the ordiname to movtes that are obscene as to mmors 
Neither appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested such a 
limltatlon, perhap::< becau:'e a rewritmg of the ordinanee would be 
DPCessury to reaeh that rc ... ult. 
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Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is path 
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all 
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters, 
the owners and operators of these theaters are faced with 
an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution of themselves 
and their employees they must either restrict their movie 
offerings or construct adequa-te protective fencing which 
may be ~expensive or even physically im-
practicable.16 Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 
406 U. S. 498, 513 (POWELL, J.1 dissenting). 
IV 
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not 
deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of 
Jacksonville. We hold only thttt the present ordinance 
does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that 
apply when government attempts to regulate expression. 
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have re-
peatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity 
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites are absent 
here. Accordingly the judgment below is 
Reversed .. 
16 In this case appellan1 lumself is :1 theater manager. Hence the· 
statute's deterrPnt effect ar·'s upon him personally; he is not seeking 
to raise the hypvthetical ri~hts of o1 hers. Sre Breard v. Alexander,, 
~H lJ. 8. 1!22, 6.41 (1951) .. 
2nd DRAFT 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a 
Jacksonvilk. Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing 
films containin~ nudity by a drive-in movie theater when 
its screen is visible from a public street or place. 
I 
Appellant, Richard Erznoznik, is the manager of the 
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March 
13, 1972, he was charged with violating § 330.313 of the 
municipal code for exhibiting a motion picture, visib]P. 
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare 
breasts were shown." 1 The ordinance, adopted January 
14, 1972, provides: 
"330.313 Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From 
Public Streets or Public Places. It shall be unlawful 
1 The movie, "Cia~s of '74," hnd been rated "R" by the Motion 
Picture ARsorintion of America. An "R" rating indicate.'\ that youthR 
may be admitted onl~r when accomprmied by a parent or guardian. Sre 
~rcnerally Friedman, The Motion Pirture Rating Systrm of 1968: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 
Col. L. Rev. 185 (1973). Although there is nothing in the record 
- , . 
73-1942-0PINION 
2 ERZNOZNIK v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE 
and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any 
t icket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture pro-
jection machine operator, manager, owner, or any 
other person connected with or employed by any 
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist 
in exh ibiting, any motion picture. P11d e, or other ex-
hibit in which the human male or female bare but-
tocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare 
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, 
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or 
public place. Violation of this section shall be pun-
ishable as a. Class C offense." 
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor, 
successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the 
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate 
dec]flr <l torv nrtion. Tn that artio•• appellee , the city of 
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen 
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public 
streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was 
also testimony indicating that people had been observed 
watching films while sitting outside the theater in parked 
cars and in the grass. 
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate 
excrf'ise of the municipulity's police power, and ruled that 
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights. 
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida, 
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 ( 1974), relying exclusively on 
ChPmline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721 
(CAl) 1966). which had sustained a similar ordinance. 2 
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges 
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes 
pictures of uncovered female breasts and buttocks. 
2 The only other Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this ques-
tion reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theatre$ Midwest 
States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973). 
, . 
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dissenting. 294 So. 2d 93 (1974). We noted probable 
jurisdiction,3 419 U. S. 822 (1974), and now reverse. 
II 
Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond 
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and thus applies to films that 
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). Nevertheless, it maintains 
that any movie containing nudity ·which is visible from a 
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several 
theories are advanced to justify this contention. 
A 
Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect 
its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that 
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinance, however, 
does not protect citizens from all movies that might 
offend; rather it singles out films containing nudity, pre-
sumably because the lawmakers considered them espe-
cially offensive to passersby. 
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the 
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy 
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or audi-
tors-in a variety of contexts. See, e. g., Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Breard v. Alexander, 341 
U. S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15 (1971); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298 (1974). See generally Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: 
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 N. W. U. L. 
8 A local ordinance is deemed a state statute for purposes of invok-
ing this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). See King 
Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100 (1928). 
~. 
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Rev. 153 ( 1972). Such cases demand delicate balancing 
because 
"r i ln th l e l !'ph ere of collision between claims of 
privacy and those of r free speech or] free press, the 
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of our society." 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,- U. S. -,-
(1975). 
i\ltho11gh e:wh caf'e ultimately mllst depend on its own 
f'pecific facts, some general principlrs hnve emf'rgcd. .1\. 
State or munieipalit? may protect individual privacy 
hy enacting reasonablP time. plac<'. a.nrl manner regu-
lations applicable to all speech irrcspcri ivc of content. 
8cc Kovacs v. Cooper, supra; Cox v. Louisiarw, 379 U.S. 
536. 554 (1065): AdrlPrly v. Florida, :385 F. 8. 09 (1966). 
Bnt wl1f'n tlw governnwnt. act.ing ac:; ccnf'or. nndertakrs 
selPctivclv to shield the publir from some kinds of speech 
on thr ground that they are more offemiYe thnn others. 
tho First Amendment strictly limitR its power. See, 
P. g., Police Deparhnent of Chicago v. MoslPy, 408 U.S. 
92 (1972): Fowler v. Rhode Island, 041) F. S. 67 (1953); 
Kovacs Y. Cooper, 336 r. S., at 07 (Jackson, J .. con-
curring). Such sol<'ctive restrictions have heen upheld 
only when the :spenkcr intrndcs on the privacy of the 
home. soc Rowan v. Post Office J)epl., 307 U. S. 728 
(1!170) ,4 or the degree of captivity mnkes it impractical 
for the unwilling viewPr or anditor to avoid exposure. See 
4 Rowan invoh·ed a congressional st:ltute th::tt permits a person 
receiving "a pandering adYcrtisement" which he believes to be 
"eroticnlly arousing or se:\'1llllly provocntive" to instruct the Po~t­
master Genernl to inform the sender that snrh mail is not to be 
sent in the future. The Court UJlheld the statute, emphasizing that 
individunl priYacy is entitled to gre:lter protection in the home 
than on tho streetR ::md notinu: that "the right of eYery pen;on 'to 
he let alone' mw•t be placed in the scaleR with the right of others 
to communicate." See id., at 736-738. 
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Lehman Y. City of Sha/;cr Heights, supra." As Mr . 
.T ustirc> Harlan cautioned: 
"The ability of government. consonant with the 
C:ont:titution. to shut off clil'rourse solrly to pro-
tect otlwrs from hearin~ it is ... clcpc>nrlent upon a 
showing that substantial privacy interests are being 
invaclrcl in an essentiallv intolerable manner. Any 
hroaclrr vie"· of this mtthority would effectively em-
ploy a majority to silenre dissidents simply as a 
matter of personal prrclilections." Cohen v. Cali-
forml!, 403 U. 8., at 21. 
The plain. if a.t times disquieting, truth is that in our 
11lnralistiP- society, constantly proliferating new and in-
gc>Pious forms of exnre"'sion. "we arP inescapahlv rantive 
nmlienreR for n1m1y purpol'es." Rowan v. Post Office 
Dept., 307 F. S .. at. nG. Murh that we rnrotmter 
offends our esthetir. if n0t our politica 1 and moral. sensi-
bilities. Nevertheless. the C'onstitution does not permit 
the govrrnmcnt to derirle "·hirh typrs of othrnYi~e pro-
tcrterl sprrrh are sufllriently offppc:;ivr to require protrc-
tion for the unwilling listener or Yirwrr. Rather. absent 
tlw narrow circumstances rlesrribrd abovr.G thr bnrrlrn 
~In J,ehman tlw Comt ~nstained .~ muniripnlitv'R polir:v of hnrring 
pn1iti~n l ~(h·rrt;~f'lTII'lltR whik llf'l'mit tir<e nonpoliti,.!1l nrlvNtiormrntR 
on ritv hnor;'. Thr issue wn~ whether thr ri1v h:1d rrrnt0r! a "m1hlic 
fnrnm" :1ni! thrrrlw nhliq~trd it srlf in ~rrr11t nll fldrrrtisim:. 1Vhilr 
rnnrlnrlin" th::1t no pnhlir fornm hncl l)('rn rstflhlislwrl. h0th tlw 
pJnrnJitY 11nr! ('f\J'rllfl'ill'! Ollininno l'f'r'Ognizrd th:1t thr O C' '!f('(' of 
rapt j,·itY n nrl tlw rr~nltnn1 int rn"inn rn nri\'!1rY i~ siu:nifirantlv 
:rrr:-~tf'T' fnr n D'lo<rn!!rr on ::1 h118 thnn for :1 prroon on thr strrrt. 
8re ir1 .. r~t 102-104 (opinion of Mn . .T1T"1"C'l" BLM'TC\fTT"T). nnd at 
10fi-10f~ (DoumA" . .T.. rrmrrrriprr) . S00 :1l.•n Publir Utilities C'nmm'n 
v. Pnl/ak, :H1 TT. q. 451. 4fi7 (HHi2) (Dour.LA"l, .T., di;::<:rntinu:) . 
r. It h'l~ nli'O lwrn Sll!!!!f'"trrl 1 h:1t go\'rrnmrnt mnv nroorrihr, hy 
a prnprrlY frnm"d lnw, "thr willful 11<:0 of <:rnrrilom: bngn'lgr rnlru-
lated to offend the sensibilitic<: of an unwilling flndicnce." Rosen-
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normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bom-
bardment of [hi:- l sensibilities :::imply by averting [his] 
eyes." Cohen v. California., 408 U. S .. at 21. See also 
Spence v. TY ashington, 418 U. S. 405. 412 (1974). 
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminate:> among movies 
solPlv on the basis of contC'nt. 7 Its cff~ct is to deter 
drive-in theaters from showin!S 111ovies containing any 
nurlitv. however innocent or cvC'n educationnP This 
discrimination cannot he justified es a means of prevent-
fe/d v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901, 905 (PowF.LL, J., dissenting). 
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In such cases 
the speaker may seek to "forrr p11blic confrontation with the 
potentially offensive aspertB of the vvork." Id., at 470. It may 
not bo tho content of the speerh, as much as the deliberate 
"verb1l r or visual] a~~ault," Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, thrtt justifies 
prosrrip1ion. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967). 
In the present case, howc,·er, appelhnt is not trying to reach, much 
less shark, unwillinp; viewers. Appellant manages a commercial enter-
prise whirh depends for its snrcess on paying customers, not on free-
loading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, the 
srrrm of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not 
pay 
7 Rrenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a 
book. must be conRidered as a part of the whole \Vork. See Miller 
v. California, 413 U. S., nt 24; Kois v. Wisconsin. 408 U. S. 229 
(1972). In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind 
of pnb1 i ~ nudity traditionnlly subject to indecent. exposure bws. 
Sec Rflth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 512 (1957) (DouGLAS, J., 
dissenting) ("No one would suggest that the First Amendment per-
mits nudity in public pluc·es"). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). 
8 Surh a deterrent, although it might not result in total suppres-
sion of these movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-519 (1958). The record does not indi-
cate how much it would cost to block public view of appellant's 
theater. Such costs generally will vary with circumstances. In one 
case the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter million 
dollars. Seo Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. City of Pagedale, 
441 S. W. 2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969). 
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ing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance 
seeks only to keep these film.s from hcing flecn from pub-
lic streets and places where the offended viewer readily 
can avert his eyes. In short, the screcn of a drive-in 
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for 
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup 
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 760 (1967). Thus, 'vc con-
clude that the limited privaey interest of personf' 011 the 
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise 
protected speech on the basis of its r0111:r'nt.n 
B 
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as 
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to pro-
tect children. Appellee maintains that even though it 
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity 
to adults, the pref'!ent ordinance is a reasonable means 
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence. 
It is well settled that a State or municipality can 
adopt more string0nt controls on communicative mate-
rials available to youths than on those available to 
adults. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 
(1968). Nevertheless. minors are entitled to a signifi-
cant me8"llre of First Amendment protection, see Tinke1· 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 
393 U. S. 503 (1969) , and only in relatively narrow :mel 
well-defined circumstances may government bar public 
dissemination of protected materials to them. See, e. g., 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U. S. 676 
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968) . 
o \Ve nrc not conrernrd in this rnse with n pro11crly drnwn zoning l 
ordiunnce restrictinp; the locntion of dri,·c-in thcntcrs or with n non-
disrriminntory nuis~mrc ordinnnce drsigncd to protrrt the privacy of 
persons in their hornet! from the Yisual and audible intrusions of RIICh 
thentcrs. 
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Tn this case, aPsuming the ordinance is aimed at pro·-
hibitinp; youths from viewing the films, the restriction is 
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed 
ngainst sexually ex1)licit nudity nor is it otherwise 
Jimiterl. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films 
containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespec-
tive of context or pervasivencs~. Thus it would bar a 
film containing a picture of :1 baby's buttocks, the nurle 
borl.v of a war victim. or Rcenes from a culture in \vhich 
nudity is inrlig<'nous. The ordinance also might pro-
hibit ne\YF<reel scenes of t.hc opening of an art exhibit as 
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly aU nudity 
cannot he cleemcd obPc<'ne even ~ts to minors. ~ee G1'ns-
berg \'.New York, sU])ta. '" X or en n Purh a broad restric-
tion be .iul"t ificcl by any other governmental interest 
pertaining to 1ninors. Speech t.hat is neither 0bsrene as 
to youths nor !'lnb.iect to some other legitimate 1)roscrip-
tion can not be sum1resserl solely to protect the young 
from icle~s or images that a lcgjplativc body thinks un-
Ruitable for them. In n1oRt circumRtanres," the values 
10 1 n (Jin sbrra t hr C'ourt ado pied n ,·ari:tt ion of t hr adu!f ob,rrnity 
Rtrmdard~ rnnnrinte<l in Roth v. Unitrd Stntes, 354 U.S. 476 (Hl,17) , 
and MPrnoirs v. Massar·h11Srtts. 383 U. 8. 413 (1966) (pluralit~· opin-
ion). In Miller v. Califomia. supm, wen bnndonPd the Roth-M ernoirs 
iP~t for jnd~Ting obsrcnit~· with rrRpcrt to aclultR. We have not had 
orr:1sion to deride what cfTcrt Millrr will hnvr on the Ginsberg formu-
btion. It iR dear. ho\YCYcr. thnt undrr :1n~ · trRt of obsrrnity us to 
minors 11ot. nll nndit~· would hr proscribed. Rather, to br oh~rcnP 
"snrh expre~<~ion mnRt hr, in Rome significant wa)', rrot ic." Cohrn Y. 
California, 403 U. S., at 20. See Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. STaton, 
413 U. S. 49, 106-107 (1973) (BnENNAN, .T., diRscnting). 
11 ThP Fir"t Amrnclmrnt rightR of minor.;; arr not "ro-rxtrn~ivr 
with those of adults." Tinker v. Des Moinrs Independent Com-
munity Srhool Dist., 393 U. S., nt 515 (STEWART, J., roncurrinf!). 
"[A] statr mn~· permiRRibbr dctrrmine thflt at lcnRt in some precisely 
drliueatrd nrcaR, :1 rhilcl-likc Romconc in :1 captiw nnclicncr-i~ not 
possrRRed of thnt full capnrity for individunl choice which is the 




ERZNOZNIK v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE 9 
protected by the First Amendment are no lcs~ applicable 
"·hen government seeks to control the flow of information 
to minors. See 'Pi11ker v. D es ~Moines Independent Com-
rnun?ty Srhool Dist.. supra. Cf. TV est Virginia Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 310 U.S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jack-
sonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expression 
accessible to minorc.; it is ovPrbroacl in its proscription.' 2 
c 
At oral argument appelJee, for the first time. sought 
to justif? its ordin::mce as a traffic regulation. It claimed 
that nudity on a drive-in movie screen distracts passing 
motorists, thus slo,ving the flow of traffic and increasing 
the likelihood of accidents. 
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinnnce 
suggests that it is airned at traffic regulation. Indeed, 
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from pnb-
lic places as "·ell as public streets. thus indicating that 
it is not a trn:ffic regulation. But even if this were the 
purpose of the ordinance. it nonetheless wo11ld be invalid. 
B:v singling out movi0s contnining even the n10st fleeting 
and innocent glimpses of nudity the lPgislative classifica-
tion is strikingly underinch1sive. There is r10 reason to 
think that a wirlr vnri0tv of other scenes in the custom-
ary R~'reen diet. ranging from soap opera to violence, 
''"mlld be any lm:s distracting to the pasE:ing motorist .. 
This Conrt freqncntly has uph0ld lll'dPrinclusivC' clas-
sifications on the sound throry that a legislature may 
deal with one part of a 11robl0m "·ithout addressing all 
of it. See. e. g., Will1'ams v. Lee Opt?'cal . Inc., 348 U. S. 
483. 488-489 ( Hl55). This presumption of statutory 
York. :390 U. R., nt G40-fl50 (STJc"I'.' I\HT, .T., romurring). In Hi'SE'~'~'ing 
whrther a minor hn;;: tho rrqui'<itc cnparity for incli1·idunl choirc 
thr :1ge of the minor i;;: a oignifirnnt factor. Scr Rowan v. Post Office 
Dept .. 397 U. S., at 741 (DRENNAN, J., concurring). 
1 ~ ~cr P:~rt II[, infra. 
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validity, however, has less force when a classific::ttion 
turns on the subject matter of expression. "[A]bove all 
else, the First Amendment means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police 
D ept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus, 
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the 
First Amendment itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regula-
tion cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless 
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also 
Cox v. Louisi.ana, 379 U.S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.). 
Cf. WWiams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Sh.apiro v. 
Thompsorn, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). 
Appellee offers no justification, nor are we aware of 
any. for distinguishing movies containing nudity from 
all other movies in a regulation designed to protect 
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance can-
not b<' salvaged by this rationalc.13 
III 
Even though none of the reasons advanced by appellee 
will sustain the Jacksonville ordinance, it remains for us 
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on 
its fnce. This Court has long recognizrd that a demon-
strnbly overbroad statute or ordinance may deter the 
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. None-
theless, when considering a facial challenge it is neces-
sary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalida-
tion may result in unnecessary interference with a state 
regulatory program. In accommodating these compet-
1 3 This is not to say that a narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory 
traffic regulation requiring screening of drive-in movie theaters from 
the view of motorists would not be a reasonable exercise of police 
power. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S., at 98, and 
cases cited. 
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mg interests the Court has held that a state statute 
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not 
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state 
courtf'. see Dombro1uski v. Pfister, 380 U. 8. 479, 497 
(1065), and its deterrent effect on legitimate rxprcseion 
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U. S. 601, 612-615 (J 973). Sec gcnrrally 
Note. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine. 83 
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). 
Tn the presrnt case the possibility of a limiting conl"truc-
tion appNtrs remote. Appellee explicitly joined in this 
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing 
to stay anpellant's prosecution. 14 l\1orcovcr . the ordi-
na.nce by its plain t.erms is not easily susceptible to a 
narrowing construction.'" Indeerl, when the state courts 
\Vere presented Yvith this overbreadth challenge they 
made no effort to restrict. its nnplication. Compare 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613 
(1971), and Brandenburg v. Ohin. ~95 TT. S. 444, 448--449 
(1969), with Cox v. l'lew Ham'{lshire. 312 U.S. 569, 575-
576 (1941), and Ch.'J,plinsky v. New H a.mpshire, 315 U. S. 
568, 572-.C570 (1942). In thPse ,..i rcP mstaJlCes, partieu-
larly where as here appellee offerR r(wera1 distinct jPstifi-
ca.tions for the ordinance in its bro .. rle"'t terms, there is no 
reason to assume that the ordinance can or will be deci-
14 In thi~ respect the present case nrises in a posture that differs 
from most challenges to a statute or ordinance considered by this 
Court. Typically in such cases the issue arises in a context where 
the statute or ordinance has been applied to allegedly unprotecied 
activity. Thus, we are able to consider the constitutionality of the 
statute "as applied" as well as "on its face." 
10 The only nnrrO\Ying construction which occur~ to us would be 
to limit tho ordinance to movies that are obscene as to minors. 
NeiLhor appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested such a 
limitation, perhaps because a rewriting of the ordinance would be 
necessary to reach that. result. 
'. 
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sivcly narro\\·ecl. Sec Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U. S. 104, 111-1 12 (1972) ; Time, Inc. v. Hnl, 385 U. S. 
374, 397 (1967). 
Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is both 
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all 
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters, 
the owners ancl operators of these theaters are faced with 
an umvclcome choice: to avoicl proscf'ution of themselves 
and their employees they must either restrict their movie 
offerings or construct adequate protective fencing which 
mn,y be extremely expensive or even physically im- J 
prarticable.1 r. Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. l\1acMullan, 
406 U. S. 498, 513 (PowELL, J., dis~enting). 
IV 
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not 
deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of 
Jacksonville. \Ve hold only that the present ordinance 
does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that 
apply when government attempts to regulate expression. 
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have re-
peatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity 
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites are absent 
here. Accordingly the judgment below is 
Reversed. 
JoIn this c::~sc :1ppcllnnt him~rlf i~ a theater man:1gcr. Hence the 
statute's deterrent effect acts upon him perHonnlly; he is not seeking 
to r::~isc the hypothetic::~! rights of other~. See Breard v. Alexander, 
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This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a 
Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing 
films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when 
its screen is visible from a public street or place. 
I 
Appellant, Richard Erznoznik. is the manager of the 
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March 
13, 1972, he was charged with violating ~ 330.313 of the 
municipal code for exhibiting a motion picture, visible 
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare 
breasts were shown." 1 The ordinance, adopted January 
14, 1972, provides: 
"330.313 Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From 
Public Streets or Publ·ic Place,~ . It shall he unlawful 
1 Thr movit>, "ClaH;o; of '74,'' had been rafl'd "R" by the MoLion 
Ptrture Assoeiation of America. An "R" rating iudicat(';o( thl).t youths 
may be admittrd only when nccompnu:dd by a parrnt or guardian . S<m 
grnerall~· Frirdman, The Motion Picture Rating Sy;:;tpm of 1968. A 
Constitutionnl Analysis of SPlf-Regulntion by the Film Industry, 73 
Col. 1 •. Rev. 185 (1973) . Although there is nothing in the record 
. ' 
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and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any 
ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture pro-
jection machine operator, manager, owner, or any 
other person connected with or employed by any 
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist 
in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other ex-
hibit in which the human male or female bare but-
tocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare 
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, 
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or 
public place. Violation of this section shall be pun,. 
ishable as a Class C offense." 
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor, 
successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the 
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate 
declaratory action. In that action appellee, the city of 
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen 
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public 
streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was 
also testimony indicating that people had been observed 
watching films while sitting outside the theater in parked 
cars and in the grass. 
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate 
exercise of the municipality's police power, and ruled that 
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights .. 
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida, 
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 (1974), relying exclusively on 
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721 
(CAS 1966), which had sustained a similar ordinance.2 
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges 
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes: 
pictures of uncovered female brea::;ts and buttocks. 
2 The only other Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this ques-
tion reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theat1·es Midwest 
~~tq,tes, Inc . v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 {CA7 1973). 
... 
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dissenting. 294 So. 2d 93 (1974). We noted probable 
jurisdiction/ 419 U. S. 822 (1974), and now reverse. 
II 
Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond 
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and thus applies to films that 
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). Nevertheless, it maintains 
that any movie containing nudity which is visible from a 
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several 
theories are advanced to justify this contention. 
A 
Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect 
its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that 
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinance, however, 
does not protect citizens from all movies that might 
offend; rather it singles out "films containing nudity, pre-
sumably because the lawmakers considered them espe-
cisJly offensive to passersby. 
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the 
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy 
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or audi-
tors- in a variety of cuntexts. See, e. g., Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949·); Breard v. Alexander, 341 
U.S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15 (19'11); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298 (1974). See generally Haima.n, Speech v. Privacy: 
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 N. W. U. L. 
3 A local ordinance is deemed a state statute for purposes of invok-
ing this Court's jurisdictwn under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). See King 
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Rev. 153 (1972). Such cases demand delicate balancing 
because 
" [ i] n th [ e] sphere of collision between claims of 
priva,cy and those of [free speech or] free press, the 
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of our society." 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,- U.S.-,-
(1975). 
Although each case ultimately must depend on its own 
specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A 
State or municipality may protect individual privacy 
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regu-
lations applicable to all speech irrespective of content. 
See Kovacs v. Cooper, s·upra; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
536, 554 (1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes 
selectively to shield the p:.tblic from some kinds of speech 
on the ground that they are more offensive than others, 
the First Amendment strictly limits its power. See, 
e. g., Police Depa.rtment of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S., at 97 (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Such selective restrictions have been upheld 
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the 
home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 
(1970)/ or the degree of captivity makes it impra.ctical 
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. See 
'Rowan involved a congressional statute that permits a person 
receiving "a pandering advertisement" which he believes to be 
"erotically arousing or s<'xually provocativt>" to instruct the Post~· 
master General to inform the sender that tluch mail is not to be 
sent in the future . The Court upheld the statute, emphasizing that 
individual privacy is entitled to greatt>r protection in the home 
than on the streets and noting that "the right of every pertlon 'to 
be let alone' must be placed in the srales w1th the right. of ot.hers; 
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Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra.5 As Mr. 
Justice Harlan cautioned: 
11The ability of government, consonant with the 
Constitution~ to shut off discovrse solely to. pro-
tect ot,hers from hearing it is ... dependent upon a 
showing that substantial privacy interests are being 
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any 
broader view of this authority would effectively em-
ploy a majority to silence dissidents simply as a 
matter of personal predilections." Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U. S., at 21. 
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our 
pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and in-
genious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive 
audiences for many purposes." Rowan v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U. S., at 736. Much that we encounter 
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensi-
bilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit 
the government to decide which types of otherwise pro-
tected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protec-
tion for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent 
the narrow circumstances described above,6 the burden 
5 In Lelmum the Court sustained a municipality's policy of barring 
political advertisements while permitting nonpolitical advertisements 
on city buses. The issue was whether the city had created a "public 
forum" and thereby obligated itself to accPpt all advertising. While 
concluding that no public forum had been established, both the 
plurality and concurring opinions recognized thl't the degree of 
captivity and the resultant intrusion on privacy is significantly 
greater for a paosenger on a bus than for a person on the street . 
See id., at 302-304 (opinion of Mn . .lusTrcE BLACKMUN), and at 
306-308 (DouGLAs, .T., concurring). See also Public Utilities Comm'n 
v. Pollak, 343 LT . S 451, 467 (1952) (DouGLAs, .T., dissenting). 
6 It has also been suggested that. government may proscribe, by 
:1 properly framed law, "the willful use of scurrilous language calcu-




6 ERZNOZNIK v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE 
normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further born .. 
bardment of [hisl sensibilities simply by averting {his] 
eyes." Cohen v. CaUfornia, 403 U. S., at 21. See also 
Spence ·v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 412 (1974). 
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies 
solely on the basis of content} Its effect is to deter 
drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any 
nudity, however innocent or even educationaP This 
discrimination cannot be justified as a means of prevent-
feld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901, 905 (PoWI!1LL, J., dissenting) . 
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 38:~ U. S. 463 (1966). In such cases 
the speaker may seek to "force public confrontatimi with the 
potentially offensive aspects of the work." Jd., at 470. It may 
not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate 
"verbal [or visual] assault," Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, that justifies 
pro:::cription. See Redrup v. New Yorlc, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1967). 
In the present case, however, appellant is not trying to reach, much 
less shock, unwilling viewers. Appellant manages a commercial enter-
prise which depends for its success on paying rustomers, not on free-
loading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, the 
screen of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not 
pay. 
7 Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a 
book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. See Miller 
v. California, 413 U. S., at 24; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229 
(J 972). In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind 
of public nudity traditionally snbject to indecent exposure laws. 
See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 512 (1957) (DouGLAs, J ., 
dissenting) ("No one would suggest that the First Amendment per~ 
mits nudity in public places"). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 
u. s. 367 ( 1968) . 
8 Such a dett>rrent, although it might not result in total suppres-
sion of i hese movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 5.18-519 (1958) . The record does not indi-
cate how rp.uch it would cost to block public view of appellant's 
theater. Such cosh; generally will vary with circumstanr.es. In one 
case the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter million 
dollars. See Olympic Drive-In The.atre , Inc. v. City of Paged(lie, 
441 S. W. 2d 5" 8 (M0i. 19:69}. 
.•. t,.{ 
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ing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance 
seeks only to keep these films from being seen from pub-
lic streets and places where the offended viewer readily 
can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in 
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for 
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup 
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967). Thus, we con-
clude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the 
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise 
protected speech on the basis of its content.t~ 
B 
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as 
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to pro-
tect children. Appellee maintains that even though it 
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity 
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means 
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence. 
It is well settled that a State or municipality can 
adopt more stringent controls on communicative mate-
.rials available to youths tha.n on those available to 
adults. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 
(1968) . Nevertheless, minors are entitled to a signifi-
cant measure of First Amendment protection, see Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 
393 U. S .. 503 (1969), and only in relatively narrow and 
well-defined circumstances may government bar public 
dissemination of protected materials to them. Ree, e. (!., 
Interstate Circuit, Inr:. v. City of Dallas, 390 U. S. 676 
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968). 
u We are not concerned in thi:; case with tt properly drawn ..::oning 
ordinance re~;tricting the location of dnve-iu thraters or with a uon-
discriminnt.ory nuisanee ordinnnce designPd to protect the privacy of 
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In this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at pro-
hibiting youths from viewing the films, the restriction is 
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed 
against sexually explicit nudity nor is it otherwise 
limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of a.Il films 
containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespec-
tive of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a 
film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude 
body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which 
nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might pro-
hibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as 
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly all nudity 
cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors. See GinS'-
berg v. New Y ark, supra.10 Nor can such a broad restric-
tion be justified by any othec governmental interest 
pertaining to minors. Speech that is neither obscene as 
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscrip-
tion cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young 
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks un-
suitable for them. In most circumstances,11 the values 
10 In Ginsberg the Court adopted a variation of thP adult ob~cenity 
stnnda.rdt> euunciatPd in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), 
and Memoits v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (pluralit~ opin-
ion). In Miller v. Califotnia, supm, we abandoned the Roth-Memoirs 
te~t for judging obscPnity with rP~pPct to adults. WP have not had 
occaHion to decide what effect Mi:ller will have on the Ginsbetg fornlll-
lation. H is dear, howPver, that undE-r an~· test of obscenity as to 
miuor~ not all nudity would be pro~eribed. Hather, to be obHcene 
"surb expreRsion must be, in some significant way, erotic." Cohen v. 
Califoruin. 1Da U. S., at 20. See Paris Adult Theatre l v. Slaton, 
41;) t'. 8. !H, 106-107 (19i3) (BHEKNAN 1 ,f., di~sentmg). 
11 The Fir81 Amendment rightf' of minor~ are not ' ' co-Pxtm~ivc· 
with lhot>e of adults." Tinket v. De~ Moiues Independent Corn-
rnnnity Schoof Dist., 393 U. 8., at 515 (S'I'EWAH1', J., conrurring) . 
"[A] state may perrmssibly detPrnune that at least in some preriRrly 
de1iuratt•!l an'a8, a child--likE' someone in a raptive audience-i~ not 
posseH8ed of that full capacity for individual choice which i~ the 
pmmpposition of First AmendmenL guarantee,;." Gin;oben; v. New: 
'13-1942-0PINION 
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protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable 
when government seeks to control the flow of information 
to minors. See Tinl.:er v. Des Moines Independe-nt Cqrn-
munity School DtSt., supra. Cf. West Virginia Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jack-
sonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expressiOn 
ac.cessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscriptjon:1'2: 
c 
At oral argument appellee, for the first time, sought 
to justify its ordinance as a traffic regulation. It claimed 
that nudity on a drive-in movi~ screen distracts passing 
motorists, thus slowing the flow of traffic and increasing 
the likelihood of accirients. 
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinance 
suggests that it is aimed at traffic regulation. Indeed, 
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from pub~ 
lie places as well as public streets, thus indicating that 
it is not a traffic regulation. But even if this were the 
purpose of the ordinance, it nonetheless would be invalid. 
By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting 
and innocent glimpses of nudity the legislative classifica-
tion is strikingly underinclusive. There is no reason to 
think tha.t a wide variety of other scenes in the custom-
ary screen diet, ranging from soap opera ta violence, 
would be any less distracti;1g to the passing motorist. 
This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive clas-
sifications on the sound theory that a legislature may 
deal with one part of a problem without addressing all 
of it. See, e. g., Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U. S. 
483, 488-489 (1955) . This presumption of statutory 
York, :190 11. S., a.i 649-650 (S'l'BWAR'l', .1 , concurring). In a~~<t':sHing 
whether lt minor has the reqmHit(' eapacity for individual l'hoice 
the age of thf' minor 1s a t~i~nificant factor, See Rowan v. Post Office. 
Dept ., :m7 U . S., at 711 (BRRNNA:-., .1., conrnrring). 
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.I' 
validity, however, has less force when a classification 
turns on tl~e subject matter of expression. "[A]bove ali 
else, the First Amendment means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police 
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus, 
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the 
First Amendmeut itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regula-
tion cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless 
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also 
box v. L01.lisiana, 379 tJ. S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.). 
Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Shapiro 'V. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). 
Appellee offers I)O Justification, nor are we aware of 
any, for distinguishing movies contal.ning nudity from 
I all other movies in a regulation designed to protect 
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance can.:: 
not be salvaged by this rationale.13 
III 
Even though n,one of th~ reasons advanced by appellea. 
~ill sustain the .J:apkson,v;ilte, p1;?tnan9e, it r~m~ins for u~ 
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on 
its face. This Court has long recog11ized that a demon-: 
strably overbroafl statute or ordinance may deter the 
legitimate exercise. of First Amendment rights. None-
theless, when considering a facial challenge it is neces-
sary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalida-
tion may result in unnecessary interference wi.th a state 
regulatory program. In accommodating these compet-
l 3 This is t~ot to say. ihl:lt a narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory 
traffic regulation requiring ~creening of driverin movie theaters from 
the view of motorists would not be a reasonable .eN:ercise of poliGe 
pq,wer.
1 
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mg interests the Court has held that a state statute 
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not 
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state 
courts, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 497 
(1965), and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression 
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U. S. 601, 612-615 (1973). See generally 
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). 
In the preseut case the possibility of a limiting construc-
tion appears remot-e. Appellee explicitly joined in this 
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing 
to stay appellant's prosecution.14 Moreover, the ordi-
nance by its plain terms is not easily susceptible to a 
narrowing construction.15 Indeed, when the state courts 
were presented with this overbreadth challenge they 
made no effort to restrict its application. Compare 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613 
(1971), and Brandenb·u.rg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-449 
(1969), with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-
576 (1941), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568. 572-573 (1942). In these circumstances, particu-
larly where as here appellee offers several distinct justifi-
ca.tions for the ordinance in its broadest terms, there is no 
reason to assume that the ordinance can or will be deci-
14 In this respect the present case arisPr: in a posture that differs 
from most challenges to :'l. statute or ordinance considered by thb 
Court. Typically in such cases the issue arises in a eontext where 
the statute or ordinance has been applied to all<'gedly unprotected 
activity. Thus, we 11re able to eonsider the constitutionality of the 
statute "as applied" as well as "on its facEJ .. " 
15 The only narrowmg construction which occurs to us would bt• 
to limit the ordinancr to movies that are obscene as to minors. 
Neither appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested snch n. 
limitation, perhaps because a rewriting of the ordinance would ~ 
necessar:y to reach that .result. 
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sively narrowed. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U. S. 104, 111-112 (1972); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 
374, 397 (1967). 
Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is both 
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all 
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters, 
the owners and operators of these theaters are faced with 
an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution of themselves 
and their employees they must either restrict their movie 
offerings or construct adequate protective fencing which 
may be extremely expensive or even physically im-
practica.ble.16 Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan,, 
406 U. S. 498, 513 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
IV 
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not 
deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of 
Jacksonville. We hold only that the pi·esent ordinance 
does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that 
apply when government attempts to regulate expression. 
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have re-
peatedly emphasized that precision of drafting 51-Hd clarity 
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites are absent 
here. Accordingly the judgment below is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE DorGLAS took no part in the consideration / 
or decision of this case. 
111 In this case. appellant himself is a thPater manager. Hence the· 
statute's deterrent effcet. aetEr upon him personally; he is not seeking· 
to raiRe the hypothetical rights of others. See· Brea.rd v. Alexander .. 
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(d) The possibility of a narrowing constmction of the ordinance 
appears remote, particularly where appellee city offered several 
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both real and substantial. Pp. 11-12. 
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containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street 
or place, is facially invalid as an infringement of First Amendment 
rights. Pp. 3-12. 
(a) The ordinance by discriminating among movies solely on 
the basis of content has the effect of deterring drive-in theaters 
from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or 
even educational, and such censorship of the content of otherwise 
protected speech cannot be justified on the basis of the limited 
privacy interest of persons on the public streets, who if offended 
by viewing the movies can readily avert their eyes. Pp. 3-7. 
(b) Nor can the ordinance be justified as an exercise of the 
city's police power for the protection of children against viewing 
the films. Even assuming that such is its purpose, the restriction 
is broader than permissible since it is not directed against sex-
ually explicit nudity or otherwise limited. Pp. 7-9. 
(c) Nor can the ordinance be justified as a traffic regulation. 
If this were its purpose, it would be invalid as a strikingly under-
inclusive legislative classification since it singles out movies con-
taining nudity from aU other movies that might distract a passing 
motorist. Pp. 9-10. 
(d) The possibility of a narrowing construction of the ordinance 
appears remote, particularly where appellee city offered several 
distinct justifications for it in its broadest terms. Moreover, its 
deterrent effect on legitimate expression in the form of movies is 
both real and substantial. Pp. 11-12. 
288 So. 2d 260, reversed. 
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Re: 73-1942 - Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
Although the Court pays lip service to the proposition that 
1 1each case ultimately must depend on its own facts, 11 ante, at 4, it 
strikes down Jacksonville City Code § 330.313 by a mechanical appli-
cation of 11 general principles 11 distilled from cases having little to do 
with either this case or each other. Because I can accept neither that 
approach nor its result, I dissent. 
The Court's analysis begins and ends with the broad proposition 
that, regardless of the circumstances, government may not regulate 
any form of 11 co:rhmunicative 11 activity on the basis of its content. Absent 
certain 11 special circumstances, 11 we are told, the burden falls upon the 
public to ignore offensive materials rather than upon their purveyor to 
t~ke steps to shield them from view. Jacksonville's ordinance is of the 
general type proscribed by the first of these pronouncements and not 











None of the cases upon which the Cou rt relies r emotely implies 
that the Court ever intended to establish inexorable limita ti ons u pon 
state power in this area. Many cases upheld the regul ati on o f communi-
cative activity and did not purport to define the limits of the power to 
do so. ~. Lehman v. City of Shaker Height s, 41 8 U.S. 298 (1974); 
Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Beard v. Alexandria, 
341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Other 
cases relied upon by the Court were either expressly or impliedly 
decided upon equal protection grounds and, although recognizing that 
First Amendment interests were involved, turned upon 11 the crucial 
question ••• whether there is an appropriate governmental interest 
suitably furthered by the differential treatment. 11 Police Dept. of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also Fowler v. 
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 ( 1953). Such a standard necessarily 
requires particularized review. Finally, yet other of the cases cited 
by the Court were decided on vagueness and overbreadth. ~. 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). Again, application of these 
doctrines requires scrutiny of the specific statute and activity 
involved rather than reliance upon generalizations. See, ~·, 
379 U.S., at 544-58. 
In short, nothing in this Court's prior decisions justifies its 
present disregard of the admonition that ''the natu,~e of the forum and 
- 3 -
the conflicting interests have rernz.ined im.portant in determining the 
degree of protec tion affor ded by the [First] Amendment to the speech 
in question." Lehman v . C ity of Shake r Heights, 418 U.S . 298 , 
302-303 (1974) (plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Blackrnun). Rather, 
in applying this principle in contexts similar to the instant case, members 
of this Court have cautioned that every medium of communication "is 
a law unto itself, 11 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (opinion 
of Mr. Justice Jackson), and that the ''tyranny of absolutes" should not 
be relied upon " to meet the problems generated by the need to 
accommodate the diverse interests affected by the motion pictures in 
compact modern communities. 11 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 518 (1952) (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). 
A careful consideration of the diverse interests involved in this 
case illustrates, for me, the inadequacy of the Court's rigidly simplistic 
approach. In the first place, the conclusion that only a limited interest 
of persons on the public streets is at stake here can be supported only , 
if one completely ignores the unique visual medium to which the 
Jacksonville ordinance is directed. Whatever validity the notion that 
passersby may protect their sensibilities by averting their eyes may 
have when applied to words printed on an individual's jacket, see 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), or a flag hung from a second-
floor apartment window, · see Spence v. Washingtqn, 418 U.S. 405 
,....,. 
(1974), it distorts reality to apply it to the outsize screen of a drive-in 







includ ::d in the record of this case show that the screen of pe titioner's 
theater dominated the view from several public places including 
adjacent highways . Moreover, when films are projected on such 
screens the combination of color and animation against a necessarily 
dark background is designed to, and has the effect of, attracting and 
holding the attention of all observers. See Note, Motion Pictures 
and the First Amendment, 60 Yale L. J. 696, 707-708 (1951). Similar 
considerations led Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in 
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 ( 1932), to conclude that there is 
a public interest in regulating billboard displays which may not apply 
to other forms of advertising: 
11 'Advertisements of this sort are constantly before 
the eyes of observers on the streets and in street cars 
without the exercise of choice or volition on their part. 
Other forms of advertising are ordinarily seen as a 
matter of choice on the part of the observer. The 
young people as well as the adults have the message of 
the billboard thrust upon them by all the arts and devices 
that skill can produce. The radio can be turned off, but 
not so the billboard or street car placard. These 
distinctions clearly place this kind of advertising in a 
position to be classified so that regulations or 
prohibitions may be imposed upon all within the class. ' " 
285 U.S., at 110. 
So here, the screen of a drive-in movie theater is a unique type of 
eye-catching display that can be highly intrusive and diverting. Public 
authorities have a legitimate interest in regulating such displays under 
the police power, and even though traffic safety was not the only target 





that public nudity on a giant screen, v.i..:,i"'u:i.e to hundreds of drivers of 
automobiles, may have a tendency to diyert attention from the task at hand 
and cause accidents. 
No more defensible is the Court's conclusion that Jacksonville's 
ordinance is defective because it regulates only nudity. The significance 
of this fact is explained only in a footnote : 
11Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude 
persons in a book, must be considered as a part of the whole 
work. In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from 
nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws. 11 
Ante, at 6, n. 7. 
Both the analogy and the distinction are flawed. Unlike persons reading 
books, passersby cannot consider fragments of drive-in movies as a part 
of the 11 whole work11 for the simple reason that they are not exposed to the 
audio, an integral part of the medium, cf. Note, supra, at 707 and n. 27; 
nor do drivers and passengers on nearby highways see the entire visual 
display. The communicative value of such exposure falls somewhere in the 
range of slight to zero and, regardless of whether the ordinance involved 
here can be loosely described as regulating the content of a certain type of 
1/ 
display, it is not a restriction on any 11message. 11 - Cf. Police Dept. 
1/ 
The record shows that the film from which appellant's 
prosecution arose was exhibited in several in-door theaters in the 
Jacksonville area, where all who viewed it and heard the dialogue on 
headphones could consider the 11 work as a whole. 11 Moreover, the 
ordinance does not preveht the owner of a drive-ip. movie theater from 
exhibiting non-obscene films involving nudity so i6ng as he effectively 







of Chic ago....-. Ivfosley , 408 U.S. 92, 95 -96 (1972); Grayned v . City of 
Rockfo rd, 408 U . S. 104 , 11 5 (1972 ). H ence, the First Amendment 
interests 1nvol ved in this case are trivial at best. 
A ssuming, arguendo, there could be a play performed in a thea ter 
b y nude a c tors , involving genuine communication of ideas, the same 
c onduct in a public park o r s treet could be prosecuted under a n ordinance 
,,.· 
prohi bi ting indecent exposure. This is so because the police pow er has long 
been interpreted to authorize the regulation of nudity in areas to which all 
members of the public have access, regardless of any incidental effect upon 
communication. A nudist colony, for example, cannot lawfully set up 
shop in Central Park or Lafayette Park, places established for the public 
generally. Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973); 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Douglas). Whether such regulation is justified as· necessary to 
protect public mores or simply to insure the undistracted enjoyment of open -~· 
areas by the greatest number of people, its rationale applies a fortiori to 
giant displays which through technology are capable of revealing and 
emphasizing the most intimate details of human anatomy. 
- ;' ' 
In sum, the Jacksonville ordinance involved in this case is narrowly 
drawn to regulate only certain unique public exhibitions of nudity; it does 







these facts and deciding the case on the basis of absolutes the Court 
adds nothing to First Amenchnent analysis and sacrifices legitimate state 
2/ 
interests. I would affirm the judgment of the Florida Court of Appeals. -
2 I 
On my view of this case it is not necessary to deal with the 
issues discussed in Parts II. B., II. C., and III of the Court's opinion. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a 
Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing 
films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when 
its screen is visible from a public street or place. 
I 
Appellant, Richard Erznoznik, is the manager of the 
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March 
13, 1972, he was charged with violating § 330.313 of the 
municipal code for exhibiting a motion picture, visible 
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare 
breasts were shown." 1 The ordinance, adopted January 
14, 1972, provides : 
"330.313 Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From 
Public Streets or Public Places, It shall be unlawful 
1 The movie, "Class of '74," had been rated "R" by the Motion 
Picture Association of America. An "R" rating indicates that youths 
may be admitted only when accompanied by a parent or guardian. See 
generally Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 
Col. L. Rev. 185 (1973) . Although there is nothing in the record 
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and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any 
ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture pro-
jection machine operator, manager, owner, or any 
other person connected with or employed by any 
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist 
in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other ex-
hibit in which the human male or female bare but-
tocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare 
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, 
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or 
public place. Violation of this section shall be pun-
ishable as a Class C offense." 
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor, 
·successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the 
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate 
declaratory action. In that action appellee, the city of 
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen 
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public 
·streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was 
also testimony indicating that people had been observed 
watching films while sitting outside the theater in parked 
ears and in the grass. 
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate 
exercise of the municipality's police power, and ruled that 
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights. 
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida, 
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 (1974), relying exclusively on 
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721 
(CA5 1966), which had sustained a similar ordinance.2 
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges 
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes 
pictures of uncovered female breasts and buttocks. 
2 The only other Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this ques~ 
tion reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theatres Midwest 
States, Inc . v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F . 2d 1297 (CA7 1973) . 
.· 
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dissenting. 294 So 2d 93 (1974) . We noted probable 
jurisdiction,8 419 U. S, 822 (1974), and now reverse. 
II 
Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond 
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v, Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and thus applies to films that 
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U. S.153 (1974) . Nevertheless, itmamtains 
that any movie containing nudity which IS visible from a 
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several 
theories are advanced to justify this contention. 
A 
Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect 
its citizens against unwEling exposure to materials that 
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinanee, however, 
does not protect citizens from all movies that might 
offend; rather it singles out films con taming nudity, pre-
sumably because the lawmakers considered them espe-
cially offensive to passersby 
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the 
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy 
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or audi-
tors-in a variety of contexts. See, e. g., Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Breard v. Alexander, 341 
U.S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15 (1971) ; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298 (1974) . See generally Haiman, Speech v. Privacy : 
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?~ 67 N W. TJ L. 
8 A local ordinance 18 deemed a stat e statute for purposes of invok-
ing this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) . See King 
Manujacturi11{1. Co, v City Co'(.lncil of A1lgusta, 277 U S. 100 (1928). 
'13-1942-0PINION 
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Rev. 153 (1972) , Such cases demand delicate balancing 
because 
" [ i] n th [ e] sphere of collision between claims of 
privacy and those of [free speech or] free press, the 
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of our society/1 
Cox Broadca.<;ting Corp v Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 491 
(1975). 
Although each case ultimately must depend on its own 
specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A 
State or municipality may protect individual privacy 
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regu-
lations applicable to all speech irrespective of content,. 
s ·ee Kovacs v. Cooper, supra; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 
536, 554 (1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966) . 
But when the government, actmg as censor, undertakes 
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech 
on the ground that they are more offensive than others, 
the First Amendment strictly limits its power. See, 
e-. g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 
92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953); 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S., at 97 (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Such selective restrictions have been upheld 
only when the speaker intrudes on the priv.acy of the 
home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 
(1970)/ or the degree of captivity makes it impractical 
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. See 
• Rowan involved a congressional statute that permits a person 
receiving "a pandering advertisement" which he believes to be 
''erotically arousing or sexually provocatJve" to inskuct the Post-
master General to inform the sender that such mail is not to be 
sent in the future. The Court upheld the statute, emphasizing that 
individual privacy is entitled to greater protectio•n in the home 
than on the streets and noting that "the right of ·~very person 'to 
be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of othel'$ 
to comm11nicate/'' See id:, at 736-738. 
. . 
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Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra.5 As Mr. 
Justice Harlan cautioned · 
"The ability of government, cor..sonant with the 
Constitution~ to shut off discourse solely to pro-
tect others from hearing it IS •• • dependent upon a 
showing that substantial privacy interests a1·e being 
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any 
broader view of this authority would effectively em-
ploy a majority to silence dissidents simply as a 
matter of personal predilections." Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U. S., at 21. 
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our 
pluralistic society, co'lstantly proliferating new and in-
genious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive 
audiences for many purposes." Rowan v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U. S., at 736. Much that we encounter 
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensi-
bilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit 
the government to decide which types of otherwise pro-
tected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protec-
tion for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent. 
the narrow circumstances described above,6 the burden 
6 In Lehman the Court sustained a mumcipality's poliry of barring 
political advertisements while permitting nonpolitical advertisements 
on city buses. The issue was whether the city had created a "public 
forum" and thereby obligated itself to accept all advertising. While 
concluding that no public forum had been established, both the· 
plurality and concurring opinions recognized that the degree of 
captivity and tbe resultant intrusion on privacy is significantly 
greater for a passenger on a bus than for a person on the street. 
See id., at 302-304 (opinion of MR. JusTICE BucKMUN}, and at 
306-308 (DoUGLAS, J ., concurring) See also Public Utilities Comm'n 
v. Pollak, 343 U S 451 , 467 (1952) (DouGLAS, J , dissenting) 
6 It has also been suggested that government may proscribe, by 
a properly framed law, "the willful use of scurrilous language calcu-
)atcl tQ oJfelld tile smsibilit ies of an unwilling audience." R08er~P-
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normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bom-
bardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting :[his] 
eyes." Cohen v. California, 403 U. 8., at 21. See also 
Spenie v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 412 (19·74). 
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies 
solely on the basis of content/ lts effect Is to deter 
feld v. New Jersey, 408 U . S. 901, 905 (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U S. 463 (1966) . In such cases 
the speaker may seek to "force public confrontation with the 
potentially offensive aspects of the work." Id, at 470. It may 
not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate 
"verbal [or visuai] assault;'' Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, that justifies 
proscription. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1967). 
In the present case, however, appellant is not trying to reach, much 
, less shock, unwilling viewers. Appellant manages a commercial enter-
prise which depends for its success on paying customers, not on free-
loading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, the 
screen of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not 
pay. 
7 Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures 0f nude persons in a 
'book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. See Miller 
·v. California, 413 U. S., at 24; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229 
(1972) . In this respect such nudity is distmguishable from the kind 
of public nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws. 
See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 512 (1957) (DoUGLAS, J ., 
disseuting) ("No one would suggest that the First Amendment per-
mitt'! nudity in public places") . Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 
u.s. 367 (1968) . 
THE CHIEF JusTicE's dissent, in response to this point, states 
that "[u]nlike persons reading books, passersby cannot consider 
fragments of drive-in mov1es ai:i a part of the 'whole work' for the 
simple rea,;on that they see but do not hear the performance, ... " 
Post, at 4 (emphal::IIS in 01'1ginal). At i:>sue here, however, is not 
the vwwing nghts of unwilling Vll'\''erl::l but rather the nghts of 
those who operate drivt>-in theatres and the public that attends-
these e&tablishmentb. The effect of the Jacksonville ordinance is 
to increast> the cost of ohowmg films contammg nudity ln certain 
circumstances theatres w1ll avoid showmg th~se movies rather than 
incur the add1tional cost~ As a result persons who want to ::;ee-
.. :ttch film:,; at drive-ms will be unable to do RO. See n 8, infra. lt 
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drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any 
nudity, however mnocent or even educational.8 This 
discrimmation cannot be justified as a means of prevent-
ing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance 
seeks only to keep these films from being seen from pub-
lic streets and places where the offended viewer readily 
can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in 
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for 
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup 
v. New YMk, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) . Thus, we con-
clude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the 
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise 
protec\ied speech on the basis of its content.9 
B 
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as 
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to pro-
tect children. Appellee maintains that even though it 
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity 
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means 
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence. 
It ls well settled that a State or municipality can 
it! in this regard that u motion piCture must be considered a, a \ 
whole, and not as isolated fragment;; or beenes of uudlt) 
8 Such a deterrent, although it might not result in total suppres-
sion of these movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-519 ( 1958). The record does not indi-
cate how much it would cost to block public view of appellant's 
theater. Such costs generally will vary with circumstances. In one 
case the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter million 
dollars. See Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc . v City of PagedalP., 
441 S. W. 2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969) 
9 We are not concerned in th1s case with a properly drawn zoning 
ordinance restricting the location of dnve-in theaters or w1th a non-
discriminatory nuisance ordmance des1gned to protect the privacy of 
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adopt more stringf'nt controls on communicative mate~ 
rials available to youths than on those available to 
adults. See, e, g., Ginsberg v. New Y m·k, 390 U. S. 629 
(1968). Nevertheless, minors are entitled to a signifi-
cant measure of First Amendment protection, see Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist,, 
393 U.S. 503 (1969), and only in relatively narrow and 
well-defined circumstances may government bar public 
dissemination of protected materials to them. See, e. g., 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of DallM, 390 U. S. 676 
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968). 
In this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at pro-
hibiting youths from viewing the films, the restriction is 
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed 
against sexually explicit nudity, uor is it otherwise 
limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films 
containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespec-
tive of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a 
film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude 
oody of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which 
nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might pro-
hibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit a.~ 
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly all nudity 
cannot be deemed obstlene even as to minors. See Gins-
. b~g v. New York, supra.10 Nor can such a broad restric-
tion be justified by any other governmental interest 
10 In Ginsberg the Court adopted a variation of the adult obt:.cenity 
standards enuumated in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) , 
and Memoirs v. Massachmetts, 383 U. S 413 (1961'\) (plurality opin-
ion) . In Miller v California, supra, Wf' abandoned the Roth-Memoir& 
test for judging obscenity with re:5pect to adult!>. We have not had 
occasion to decide what effect Miller w1ll !.ave on the Gtnsberg formu~ 
lation. It is clear, however, that under any test of obscenity as to 
minor8 not all nudity would be pro~:~cnbed. Rathel, to be obscene 
"such expression must be, in :5ome significant way, erotic " Cohen v. 
California, 403 U S., at 20. See Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 
41:3 U. S. 49, 106~107 (1973) (BHENNAN1 J, disl:lenting). 
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pertaining to minors. Speech that is neithet· obscene as 
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate · proscrip~ 
tion cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young 
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks un-
suitable for them. In most circumstances,11 the values 
protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable 
when government seeks to control the flow of information 
to minors. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com .. 
munity School Dist., s,upra. Cf. West Virginia Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jack~ 
sonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expression 
ac.cessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscription.1.2 
c 
At oral argument appellee, ior the first time, sought 
to justify its ordinance as a traffic regulation. It claimed 
that nudity on a drive-in movie screen distracts passing 
motorists, thus slowing the flow of traffic and increasing 
the likelihood of accidents. 
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinance 
suggests that it is aimed at traffic regulation. Indeed, 
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from pub-
lic places as well as pubhc streets, thus indicating that 
it is not a traffic regulatiOn. But even If this were the 
purpose of the ordinance, it nonetheless would be invalid. 
11 The First Amendment rights of minor~ are not "co-·extensive 
with those of adults." Tinker v Des Moines Independent C(}171-o 
munity School Dist., 398 U. S., at 515 (S'l'EWART, J ., concurring) . 
"[A] state may permissibly determine that at least in some precisely 
delineated areas, a child-like oomeone m a capt1ve audu·nce-is not 
possessed of that full rapacity for individual choice which is the 
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U. S., at 649-650 (STEWART, J ,, concurrmg) . In assessing 
whether a minor hao the reqmoite capacity for individual choice 
the age of the minor is a sigmficant faetor. See Rowan v Post Office 
Dept., 397 U. S , at 741 (BHEN NAN, .T., concurrmg). 
12 See Part III, infra. 
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By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting· 
and innocent glimpses of nudity the legislative classifi~ 
tion is strikingly underinclusive There is no reason to 
think that a wide variety of other scenes in the custom-
ary screen diet, ranging from soap opera to violence, 
would be any less distracting to the passing motorist. 
This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive cla,s.. 
sifications on the sound theory that a legislature may 
deal with one part of a problem without addressing all 
of it. See, e. g., Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U. S. 
483, 488-489 (1955) . This presumption of statutory 
validity, however, has less force when a classification 
turns on the subject matter of expression. "[A]bove all 
else, the First Amendlilent means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content/' Police 
Dept. of Chicago v. M os~ey, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus, 
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the 
First Amendment itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regula-
tion cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless 
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.). 
Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). 
Appellee offers no justification, nor are we aware of 
any, for distinguishing movies containing nudity from 
all other movies in a regulation designed to protect 
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance canQ 
not be salvaged by t.his rationale.13 
18 This is not to say that a. narrowly dra\'\-'11 nondiscriminatory 
traffic regulation requiring screening of drive-in movie theaters from 
the view of motorists would not be a reasonable exercise of police· 
power. See Police Dept. of ChicagCI v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 98, and. 
cases cited. 
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III 
Even though none of the reasons advanced by appellee 
will sustain the Jacksonville ordinance, it remains for us 
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on 
its face. This Court has long recognized that a demon-
strably overbroad statute or ordinance may deter the 
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. None-
theless, when considering a facial challenge it is neces-
sary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalida-
tion may result in unnecessary interference with a state 
regulatory program. In accommodating these compet-
ing interests the Court has held that a state statute 
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not 
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state 
courts, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 497 
(1965), and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression 
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Oklo,. 
homa, 413 U. S. 601, 612-615 (1973). See generally 
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). 
In the present case the possibility of a limiting construc-
tion appears remote. Appellee explicitly joined in this 
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing 
to stay appellant's prosecution.a Moreover, the ordi-
nance by its plain terms is not easily susceptible to a 
narrowing construction.15 Indeed, when the state courtR 
14 In this respect the present case arises in a posture that differs 
from most challenges to a statute or ordinance considered by this 
Court. Typically in such cases the issue arises in a context where 
the statute or ordinance has been applied to allegedly unprotected 
activity Thus, we are able to r.onsider the constitutionality of the 
statute "as applied" as well as "on its face." 
15 The only narrowing construction which occurs to us would be 
to limit the ordinance to movies that are obscene as to minors. 
Neither appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested such a 
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were presented with this overbreadth challenge they 
m.ade no effort to restrict its application. . Compare 
Coa,tes v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613 
(1971), and Bra,ndenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-449 
(1969), with Cox y. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-
576 (1941), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 
568, 572-573 (1942). In these circumstances, particu-
larly where as here appellee offers several distinct justifi-
cations for the ordinance in its broadest terms, there is no 
reason to assume that the ordinance can or will be deci-
sively narrowed. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U. S. 104, 111-112 (1972); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 
374, 397 (1967). 
Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is both 
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all 
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters, 
the owners and operators of these theaters are faced with 
an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution of themselves 
and their employees they must either restrict their movie 
offerings or construct adequate protective fencing which 
may be extremely expensive or even physically im-
practicable.16 Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 
406 U. S. 498, 513 (POWELL, J., dissenting) . 
IV 
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not 
·deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of 
Jacksonville. We hold only that the present ordinance 
limitation, perhaps because a rewrith1g of the ordinance would be 
necl',ssary to reach that. result. 
16 In this case appellant himself is a theater manager. Hence the 
statute's deterrent effect acts upon him personally; he is not seeking 
to raise the hypothetical nghts of others. s('C Brearrl v Alexandria,.. 
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does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that 
apply when government attempts to regulate expression. 
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have re-
peatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity 
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites B.re absent 
here. Accordingly the judgment below is 
Reversed. 
